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DELEGATION 
OF THE 
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
The Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities and the 
Embassy of France present their compliments to the Department of State and 
wish to refer to the proposed Regulations issued by the Department of the 
Treasury implementing Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988. 
Section 5021 gives the President powers to investigate the effects 
on US national security of mergers, acquisitions and takeovers which could 
• result in foreign control of legal persons engaged in interstate commerce 
in the United States. These investigatory powers have been delegated to 
the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. 
Should the President decide that any such transactions threaten to impair 
the national security, he may take action to suspend or prohibit them. 
The proposed Treasury Regulations are intended to implement Section 
5021, by defining, inter alia, what transactions are subject to the 
provisions of Section 5021, the nature of the assets concerned, the 
nationality of participants in such transactions for the purposes of 
Section 5021, and the rules concerning the notification of transactions to 
the above-mentioned Committee. 
The European Community understands the wish of the United States to 
take all necessary steps to safeguard the national security. However, it 
wishes to express its concern that the scope of application of the 
proposed Regulations appears to go beyond what is necessary to protect 
essential security interests. 
European investors, who currently account for more than half of 
total direct foreign investment in the United States, anticipate 
difficulty over the wide scope of the definitions in the Regulations and 
over the lack of a definition of national security. There is serious 
uncertainty as to which transactions are notifiable under Section 5021. 
As currently drafted, the Regulations are so broad in scope that it would 
be imprudent for foreign investors not to file notice. This would be 
virtually equivalent to prescreening and notification of all new foreign 
investment. Given that the President has powers to block acquistions and, 
if necessary, to require divestment of property at any time in the future 
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without assured compensation, the effects upon the free flow of investment 
capital could be far-reaching. A schedule detailing some general concerns 
on the content of the Regulations as currently proposed is annexed to this 
note. 
The European Community would therefore request that the United 
States take steps to ensure that normal business activities may continue 
without the threat of investigation and possible Presidential action, and 
that the US Administration apply the principles of national treatment and 
freedom of establishment which the United States has in various contexts 
sought to assure for European subsidiaries of United States companies 
posessing assets in essential economic sectors in the EEC Member States. 
It is noted in this context that the intention of Congress, as 
detailed in the relevant Conference Report, was "in no way •••••••• to 
impose barriers on foreign investment". 
The European Community agrees with the United States that Investment 
flows should be determined by market forces. The formulation of 
international disciplines on trade-related investment measures is an 
important objective in the Uruguay Round negotiations. In this context it 
is noted that the US Administration has expressed its opposition to 
measures taken by other governments considered to interfere with 
investment flows and has taken steps against a third country under Section 
301 of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended by the Trade and Competitiveness Act 
of 1988. The Government of the United States has furthermore sought 
stronger OECD disciplines on national treatment for foreign investment, 
and in the OECD has consistently criticised disincentives to investment. 
The Delegation and the Embassy would further point out that European 
direct investment in the US in 1988 amounted to nearly $200 billion, while 
US investment in the Community reached almost $130 billion, with 
substantial mutual benefit in terms of employment, revenues, and export 
earnings. Given the importance of these flows to overall relations 
between the Community and the United States, the Department of State is 
reques~ed to take whatever steps are necessary, with the Government 
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Departments concerned, to reduce the potential inhibiting effects of these 
draft regulations on investment in the US. 
The Community and its Member States reserve their rights to raise 
this matter in appropriate international fora. 
The Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities and the 
Embassy of France avail themselves of this opportunity to renew to the 
Department of State the assurance of their highest consideration. 
Washington, D.C. 
27 September, 1989 
' 
ANNEX 
The difficulty of defining in legal terms concepts which were 
intended to apply in general terms ("control","national security") is 
recognised. However, in order to meet the stated objective of avoiding 
disruption to investment, the least possible interference in market forces 
is desirable. Among the areas where the scope of the implementing 
Regulations would need to be made more precise, and their scope of 
application limited, are the following: 
Definition of national security 
1.1 It is a generally recognised principle in international agreements 
which contain national security clauses that these be invoked as 
narrowly as possible. 
1.2 In accordance with the legislative history of the amendment, there 
is no definition of national security in the Regulations, 
The guidelines in the OECD Council's Recommendations on 
International Investment and Multinational Enterprises* are relevant 
here. 
1,3 At the same time, it is suggested by the Treasury that the 
Regulations are not intended to cover cases where the entire output 
of a company to be acquired consists of products or services which 
have no relation to national security. The illustrative list of 
such cases is so narrowly drawn that it creates the presumption that 
industries not on the list should automatically notify, Rather than 
a negative list, the Regulations could stipulate a positive list of 
industries where notification may be made, these being industries 
generally considered as forming part of the defence base. For other 
industries a presumption of non-notification would be the guideline. 
Alternatively, the negative list could be extended to cover a much 
larger number of industries. 
Notification 
2 .1. 
2. 2. 
* 
The Regulations state that notification can be made at any time, 
even well after the completion of the investment, and that 
divestment could be required in such circumstances, This draconian 
provision has very far-reaching ramifications and virtually obliges 
companies to file notice in the interests of legal certainty. One 
way of reducing this uncertainty might be to examine the 
introduction of a time limit on notifications, Some procedures 
would need to be envisaged which would allow speedy elimination from 
the system of transactions which have no obvious consequences for 
the national security (see para 3.2 below). 
The notification system as proposed could also have the effect, 
however unintended, of distorting competition, A company which is 
the target of a hostile bid from a foreign company, and a US 
competitor, may file notice simply to deter the foreign bidder. The 
statute could also be used against foreign lenders, on the grounds 
that an investigation could be triggered in the event of bankruptcy 
of the borrower (see 3.1. below). 
16 July 1986: published in the Acts of the Organisation, 1986, Vol. 
26, p.317 
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2.3 In this context, the information which parties to a given 
transaction must supply is not always available to the foreign 
party: the requirement to supply "known or reasonable available" 
information is drawn so broadly that it can represent a built-in 
bias. The regulations would certainly create less difficulty if it 
were made clearer what is considered an "acceptable" notification, 
2.4 Where notification is required, in order to avoid trade distortions 
each party should be invited to supply information relating 
exclusively to its part of the transaction, on a basis of equality, 
and at the same point in time, 
2.5 Under the rules set out in Section 800.402, the Chairman of CIFUS 
retains the right to reject voluntary notices if, after the notice 
has been submitted, there is a material change in the transaction to 
which notification has been made. The definition of 'material' 
should be elaborated so that investors are clear what is intended. 
In addition a more precise definition is necessary where it is 
alleged that the parties:omitted 'material' information from a 
Section 800.601 transaction subject to examination. Without such a 
definition, investors could never be sure that any review or 
investigation was "final". 
Definition of transactions 
3.1 As drafted, any transactions would be covered which could lead to 
'foreign control' of a US legal person or of assets belonging to a 
US legal person engaged in interstate commerce, virtually 
independent of issues such as the nationality of the owners and of 
the board members. Acquisitions covered would include proxy 
arrangements or any contractual provisions which could allow 
'foreign' participation in business decisions. This would apply 
even to bank loans, if a foreign bank was obliged to foreclose on a 
loan or in situations where a foreign bank, even unwittingly, became 
the owner of assets in a bankrupt US company. The provisions could 
also be applied to joint ventures, although it is not clear that 
Congress intended this. These ought therefore to be excluded. 
3.2 The instances where such normal business transactions would affect 
national security would probably be very few - far too few to 
justify such general coverage. Given the vast number of 
transactions which could be placed in question, in order to avoid 
these requirements developing into a significant trade barrier -
some limitation would need to be placed on the definition of 
'control' and indeed on the value of the assets concerned. It would 
seem reasonable to use as yardstick for control possession of a 
substantial percentage of the voting securities, and to exempt 
low-value transactions. 
3.3 The list of transactions exempt from coverage is a short one. It 
includes stock held "solely for investment", provided the foreign 
person concerned holds less than 10%. This rule of thumb, if 
applied strictly, would effectively deter shareholders from 
acquiring more stock, however little, if by doing so they could 
trigger the Section 5021 provisions. 
It is also unclear how the authorities would be able to determine 
when stock is held "solely for investment". 
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Acquired rights 
4. Furthermore, there is at present no exemption foreseen for foreign 
controlled corporations which have been established in the USA over 
long periods without creating difficulties for national security. 
This would infringe the nationally and internationally recognised 
legal principle of the protection of acquired rights. 
Extraterritorial application 
5. Acquisition of one foreign corporation by another outside the USA 
could trigger an investigation if the party acquired owned a branch 
or subsidiary in the USA. Given also the government's powers to 
subpoena information from other parties (see point 7 below) this 
could represent an unacceptable extension of US domestic law into 
the affairs of other countries, and could seriously affect foreign 
companies' competitive strategies. 
Penalties 
6.1 The President may exercise the penalties provided for in the statute 
if there is "credible evidence" that "the foreign interest 
exercising control might take actions that threaten to impair the 
national security". 
6.2. It is a matter of concern that no compensation is specifically 
provided for if limitations are placed on the use of assets acquired 
legally and in good faith, or if a 'foreign person' is divested of 
such assets. Nor is guidance given to the President in determining 
the circumstances in which such measures should be resorted to. 
This adds to the concern over the provision in the statute that the 
President's decisions are not subject to judicial review. 
Confidentiality 
7. Once notification is given, the US government may subpoena 
commercially confidential information from other parties. This 
information would very possibility include details of that party's 
activities outside the USA. Furthermore, any information supplied 
pursuant to a notification and/or investigation may under Section 
5021 be made available to members and staff of Congress. However 
well intentioned the recipients of such information may be, the 
confidentiality of widely distributed information cannot be 
completely guaranteed: the deterrent effect should not be 
underestimated. Therefore confidentiality needs to be assured. 
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